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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRENT POLL 
Petitioner and Appellant 
vs 
CITY OF SOUTH WEBER 
Respondent and Appellee 
Case No. 20040888 
REPLY OF THE APPELLANT 
NEW MATTERS FROM APPELLEE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
The following are new matters, in accord with Rule 24 (c) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, derived from the City's brief: 
(1) The City now objects to Petitioner's second issue by claiming it was 
not argued at trial court or identified as required by Rule (a) (5) (A) of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See Page 2, item #2 and the top of page 12 of the City's brief. This 
second issue was whether the Planning Commission had jurisdiction over judicial or quasi-
judicial matters, and whether the closed meeting was properly convened. 
The City argued the propriety of the closed meeting throughout each of its 
submissions to the trial court. It also conveyed an ex par'te argument to the trial 
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Court to answer allegations that its "meetings were improperly closed." See record at page 
58. This included (record at page 47) a sworn statement and notices of the meeting. The 
Appellant argued (Record - P. 50-57) that such submissions were not a prerequisite for 
Judicial Review under Utah Code § 52-4-10; and that if the Court did not strike them from 
the record (which it did not) the Appellant should be afforded the chance to review and 
respond to them. 
The City continued to cite as factual the one-sided arguments made to the trial court 
in its brief to this court. See items 1-4 of pages 4 and 5 and page 10 in the City's brief. 
Without access to those City arguments in the record, Appellant submits Addendum (A) as 
an attempt to balance this disparity. 
(2) The City takes exception to hearsay and what it considers as irrelevant input 
provided in the Appellant's brief. See pages 6 through the start of 8 in the City's brief. 
Rule 807 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence states, however, that it is not hearsay if 
the statement offered has "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as 
measured by the Court in accord with this Rule. The alleged hearsay was from City 
officials who were primarily commenting about the accuracy/completeness of official City 
records. Such records are themselves exempt from the hearsay under Rule 803 (8). The 
City had ready access to both the officials and records involved with sufficient time to 
compare the alleged hearsay obtained from City officials against those records. 
"Relevant evidence," in accord with Rule 401, is determined by the Court by 
measuring if the "consequence to the determination of the action (is) more probable or less 
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probable than it would be without the evidence." The City's claim about irrelevancy 
would be better categorized with its arguments than with its supposed statement of facts. 
(3) The City reasons now that no judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction is 
needed to close a meeting to discuss pending or reasonably imminent litigation in accord 
with Utah Code § 52-4-5 (1) (iii). It claims discussing or referencing litigation as a 
possible factor on its "Planning Commission's course or strategy" satisfies closed-meeting 
criteria. See City's brief-page 9. 
In Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Salt Lake County Commission, 28 P. 3d 686, the 
Court said, "We must decide whether an annexation matter before the Boundary 
Commission is litigation." See Addendum (A) - Appellants's brief. The Court in the 
Kearns -Tribune case then decided that "the Boundary Commission performs a judicial 
function" when applying rules to a certain set of facts. The Court further ruled that 
boundary commissions "act as quasi-judicial bodies" when considering annexation 
petitions and protests. See Addendum (B) - Appellant's reply. 
The City acknowledged that the matter "before the Planning Commission the very 
same night" of the closed meeting in question was the legislative approval of the Byram 
subdivision. See City brief- page 8. City Ordinances 10-3-2 and 10-3-5 (See Appellant's 
brief- Addendum B) show that the City's Planning Commission has no duties or powers 
within the scope of its mission which are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. 
3 
(4) The City supposes now that the Appellant felt the attorney provided a 
"mandate" to the Commission on how to vote, but claims instead that the members "were 
given options, not mandates." See City's brief- page 10. 
There is no reference in the record or the Appellant's brief showing he believed the 
City's attorney provided a "mandate" to the Commission on how to vote. See City Brief -
page 10. Appellant requested everything in general which the Court decided was outside 
closed meeting criteria, and specifically all "information obtaining" materials relating to 
legislative matters before the City's Planning Commission. 
(5) The City now claims it "is irrelevant" to the propriety of the closed meeting 
whether an attorney tells a Planning Commission that it must vote in a certain way. It 
insists that if the Commission later refers to the legislative advice provided in a closed 
meeting, this should hardly render the minutes thereof public. See City's brief page 11. 
The Court cases, Statutes and Rules referenced by both parties do not show 
authorization or any form of allowance for an attorney (or any one) to tell the Commission 
how it "must vote" within a closed meeting. See City's brief- page 11. All 
"information obtaining" was be conducted in open session as concluded in both State 
Court cases referenced on page 18 and Addendum A of the Appellant's brief. 
(6) The City supposes now that the petitioner is "unnecessarily preoccupied" on 
the function of the City's Planning Commission. It argues that he has misused three of the 
four cases cited in his brief. 
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Nothing in the record states that the Appellant was "unnecessarily preoccupied" 
with the functions of the City's Planning Commission or meant to question whether the 
City's Commission was subject to open meeting laws. Petitioner stands by the evidence, 
case law and arguments made in his brief; and disagrees with and denies the assertions 
made in the City's brief to redefine the Petitioner's case. 
(7) The City maintains now that whether the meeting was properly called, by 
someone with authority to do so, is of no consequence to this case. City's brief- page 12. 
It argued, however, on page 8 of its brief that the City's closed meeting "was 
properly called." Page 59 of the Record indicates the Mayor attested to the facts 
surrounding the calling and conducting of the closed meeting, but he was not in 
attendance. See Addendum (A) attachment #3 - reply. 
Pages 6-7, 10-12 and 16 of the Petitioners brief, pages 10 and 68 of the record and 
Addendum (A) to this reply show the relevant facts relating to how the 22 Jan 04 meeting 
was called. 
(8) The City claims, had Commissioners felt duped in being part of a suspiciously 
closed meeting, they could have moved into an open meeting; but it says there is no 
evidence that any Commissioner felt such discomfort See City's brief- page 13. 
Whether Planning Commissioners were "duped" (as defined by the City - page 13 
of its brief) can be measured against the same relevant facts as item # 7 above. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The City argued ex parte to the trial court. This one-sided practice was challenged 
but the trial court did not act on this. The City continues now to argue those same 
materials expar'te (record - page 49) to this Court, so the Petitioner has provided 
Addendum (A) in his reply to address this imbalance. 
The alleged hearsay cited by City officials clarifies City audio tapes and other 
official written records. The City had more than adequate time to dispute the alleged 
hearsay on its merit through reviews of the City's own records and interactions with its 
own officials. Such a logical exercise, however, would only add credence to the evidence 
it now wishes to diminish as hearsay. 
The City misrepresented the role of the Planning Commissioners as argued by the 
Petitioner. The Commissioners were untrained regarding closed-meetings but were not 
dupes. They were manipulated and deceived by the City Attorney and Manager, two paid 
professionals, who City officials were to trust "more often than not." The City Manager, 
according to the Mayor, apparently called the closed meeting and invited the Attorney to 
participate in a supposed strategy session over litigation; although the City's Planning 
Commission is without any level or degree of judicial responsibility. 
The evidence shows that the Commissioners were provided information in this 
closed meeting by and through those trusted advisors. The Commissioners were then told 
they "have to make your decisions based on the information he (the attorney) gave to you" 
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regarding a pending legislative matter. Therefore, the information thus obtained must be 
made available to the public as the State Legislature intended. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
One need not be an attorney to appreciate the unfairness of the City providing 
arguments about the "validity of the (closed) meetings" to the trial court without sharing 
them with the Petitioner. Record pages 49, 58. The Petitioner argued that the trial court 
should either allow him the chance to review and rebut those arguments or for the court to 
render its decision only from the closed-meeting minutes without regard to arguments 
from the Petitioner or the City. Record pages 50-55. The trial court did not respond to 
this request, so the City continued ex par'te in referencing those same arguments in its 
brief to this Court. City's brief pages 4-5,10. Addendum (A) is included in the 
Petitioner's reply to balance the disparity caused by the ex par'te of the City. 
The above practice of making one-sided arguments to the courts is indicative of a 
current City trend or informal policy. Rather than adhering to the intent of Utah Code 
Ann.§ 52-4-1 that "the peoples business should be conducted publicly," the City has 
practiced (since hiring a City Manager about six years ago) conducting much of the 
public's business in secret. This is reflected by a radical increase in closed meetings 
(record pages 1 and 66), "protecting" documents from public view (until release ordered 
by the State Records Committee) such as those showing the City bartering its legislative 
decision-making for "more than fair" deals from developers (Record 20-29), and the 
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usurping of power by the City Manager (and exercised without public accountability) over 
matters that the City Ordinances place on appointed and elected City officials [see 
Addendum (A) - reply]. This power grab was made easy by a documented policy that the 
input of paid advisors was to be followed "more often than not." Record page 40, 
Petitioners brief page 15, City's brief page 8. 
The supposed irrelevant material criticized in the City's brief was offered to the 
Court to place in perspective Petitioner's charge of manipulation of the subject closed-
meeting issue with like events. Prior to hiring the City Manager, City officials had to 
study, ask germane questions from experienced officials including those from the League 
of Cities and Towns, apply common sense and importantly take personal responsibility for 
their decisions. Having 'trusted advisors' to rely upon "more often than not," has made it 
too easy for our political processes to be manipulated (even purchased with donations, 
etc.) by developers and other special interests who now routinely bypass City officials and 
deal directly with the current real center of power in South Weber. 
The City Manager's calling/recommending the closed meeting of January 22, 2004, 
is just one example (see reply - Addendum A - attachment #4) of many where the City 
Manager has usurped power. Attachment #4 shows a transcription of audio-taped 
training provided by the League of Cities and Towns, on June 24, 2004, to almost all of 
the City's appointed and elected officials. This attachment shows, in the trainees own 
words, what happened during the January 22, 2004 closed session. 
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The Mayor argued with the instructor that anyone could "recommend" a closed 
meeting, but the instructor corrected him by saying that, "most of the time you couldn't 
have one if you wanted one." The Mayor then said the City Manager "recommended" the 
one in this case but followed with "you guys decided whether you wanted one or not." 
The attendees and instructor concluded, however, there "was no proposed closed meeting 
until we got here" on January 22, 2004. "The City Attorney was there." Attachment #3 to 
reply Addendum (A) shows the Attorney actually arrived five minutes after the start of the 
meeting, but also shows those five minutes were not used to contemplate the propriety of a 
closed meeting or to invite the Attorney to attend one. 
This audio-taped training shows that the Commission did not "appropriately call" a 
closed meeting (City's brief- page 8), so proper notice thereof could not have been posted 
on January 20, 2004 [City's brief- page 8, Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-6 (2)]. The Mayor said 
the City Manager "recommended" it, but this recommendation included calling the 
meeting and making sure the notices for it were posted January 20th. The tape shows 
Commissioners were formally oblivious to his "recommendation" until they arrived at the 
meeting. Most had first heard informally about it from the Petitioner a few hours earlier. 
City Ordinance 10-3-4 ( Addendum C- reply] states that the Commission sets the policies 
and procedures for "its own organization" (emphasis added). City ordinances showing 
the scope of responsibility for the Mayor and City Manager indicate that neither has the 
authority to call meetings for the Commission to or "invite" the City Attorney to attend. 
Therefore, the calling of the meeting violated Utah Code Ann § 52-4-2 (1) (2) (a). 
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Now the City argues that whether the closed meeting was called by any one with 
"authority" is of no consequence under the facts of this case. See City's brief- page 12. 
Note that it claimed on page 8 of this brief that the closed meeting was properly called. 
This only shows that, when the facts do not support an argument, the remaining 
alternative is to claim the matter at issue is unimportant. A Commission that had never 
held a closed meeting would not have held its first on January 22, 2004, about a matter 
involving litigation over which they had no jurisdiction, unless they were manipulated into 
one by a trusted advisor exactly as in this case. 
However, after learning of this deception in their June 24, 2004 training session, 
they did nothing to address or remedy the resulting mistake. Therefore, they must assume 
some responsibility for violating all of the subsections of the Utah Code cited in this 
regard in the petitioner's brief and the domino affects this had on all their subsequent 
legislative decisions. One such consequence was for the Commission to move against its 
own approved motion requiring a developer to obtain easements before the City would 
entertain a proposal to approve its subdivision. 
In the training session, a Commissioner asked, "Is it okay for us to receive advice in 
a closed meeting about how we should vote on a rezone or a subdivision?" The one-word 
answer was "no." See attachment # 4 page 21 of Addendum A - reply. There was no 
attempt to challenge this answer. 
Now the City argues that whether an attorney tells a Planning Commission in a 
closed meeting that they must vote in a certain way "is irrelevant" to whether the meeting 
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was properly conducted, and that if the Planning Commission later uses that advice 
"should hardly be allowed to condemn a closed meeting and render the minutes thereof 
public." As above with the improper calling of its closed fl$e meeting, the City is now 
trying to trivialize the significance of its misconduct within the closed meeting. 
The instructor in the training session (page 22 of attachment #4 -Addendum A -
reply) warned the trainees of the danger of "wandering." She told them that, even in a 
properly closed meeting, they could violate closed-meeting criteria by departing into areas 
which were outside that expressly "allowed" under provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-
4, 52-4-5(l)(a)(iii). 
Had there been a properly called and initially well conducted closed meeting (and 
there wasn't here), the City would have still "wandered" from closed-meeting criteria 
described in Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-5. Therefore, whether the City wandered from good 
intentions or had devious intentions from the beginning is irrelevant. It was in violation of 
closed meeting laws whether providing options or mandates to the Commission on how to 
vote on a legislative matter. Such would also be contrary to the legislative intent of 
having all "information obtaining" in open session as shown in the Petitioner's brief pages 
18, 19 and Addendum A. Without the Court ordering the release of options the City's 
Attorney admittedly provided to the Commission (see City's brief- bottom of page 10), 
the public will be forever deprived of those options to accurately evaluate their impact on 
the legislative decision the Attorney meant to influence. 
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The City, in referencing Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Salt Lake County 
Commission 28 P. 3d 686 (sec City brief- page 8-9), stretched the prerequisite for those 
claiming coverage under Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-5 (l)(a)(iii). The case described the need 
to "perform a judicial function" and performance of a "quasi-judicial function.9' ( see 
Addendum B - Reply). Just pursuing the "Planning Commission's course or strategy" 
which does not include any level or degree of judicial involvement whatsoever, does not 
reach the standard reflected by this case. 
The State Legislature did not envision the calling of close meetings to gossip about 
pending legislation over which a political subdivision of the State had no jurisdiction, then 
using such closure to hide "information obtaining" regarding legislative matters the 
political entity was to address that very evening. Such was the case here. 
The City maintained throughout its brief (pages 6-13) that most of the Petitioner's 
submissions were not accepted as evidence or argued in the trial court and were, therefore, 
irrelevant to this appeal. This seems particularly disingenuous in view of the City's 
making one-sided arguments to the Courts. 
"Controlling Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means that the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law." See State of Utah vs Pena,869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
(Addendum B - Reply). Therefore, as this Court will "decide for itself without deference 
"in any degree" to the trial court; the City's arguments about what happened at trial court 
are moot. 
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The City argued that much of the Petitioner's input is hearsay and not admissible as 
evidence. However, the petitioner offered those statements as evidence of material facts 
under Rule 807. Most of the alleged hearsay reflects the Petitioner's personal interaction 
with Planning Commissioners and Council members for the purpose of clarifying official 
City records. Those records themselves are an exception to hearsay under Rule 803 (8). 
The City had more than enough time to check the alleged hearsay from its own officials 
against its own official records. For example, the City made an audio tape of its 24 Jun 
2004 training session but did not transcribe this tape. Petitioner acquired this audio-tape 
through a GRAMA request, listened to it and his wife described all 27 pages of it. 
This transcript/audio tape provided a detailed accounting of what happened on 
January 22, 2004 regarding the closed meeting in question. It further showed a wide range 
of major violations of State law and City ordinances that the instructor said the City would 
lose "real quick"in Court if/when related complaints were filed. To make this a City 
record, the petitioner provided the transcript to the City. The City Manager acknowledged 
receipt in Council and Commission meetings. This transcript was made available to City 
officials. No corrective actions have been seen regarding the substantial errors (including 
the closed meeting of January 22, 2004) shown in the training session. The 
tape/transcription provides the most probative piece of evidence relating to the January 22, 
2004 event and the interests of justice are best served by its admission as evidence. 
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In August 2004, one or more Commissioners raised questions about resolving some 
of their mistakes. At least one other Commissioner, from the minutes and related audio 
tape, did not "even want to hear about" those mistakes. 
All Commissioners agreed that the City Manager said "not to follow" their 
instructor's guidance. They disagreed over exactly when he said this and whether it was 
limited in scope to a simple matter over draft minutes, or was more inclusive to include 
the infractions the instructor found. .The audio tape had an approximate 30 second void to 
make the exactness of either position uncertain. Based on the questions posed in the 
August meeting and the fact that the major problems cited in training have not been 
addressed, the Petitioner has sided with those contending that the trusted City Manager's 
advice must be construed to do nothing in regard to past mistakes. This conclusion may be 
challenged by the City as Petitioner's analysis of available City records. This is the only 
example where interpretation was mixed with the evidence provided. 
Finally, our State Legislature had sound intentions in creating laws to require that 
the people's business "be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly." 
See Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-1. It makes perfect sense for the Courts to often rely on the 
'plain language' generated with the creation of open meeting laws. 
To embrace the City's arguments, one would have to deduct that the Legislature 
really did not care if those calling and posting closed-meetings had the authority to do so. 
It also would not mind if political subdivisions of the State convened those closed sessions 
over matters which they had no jurisdiction or advisory power. Those closed sessions 
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could then be used to obtain instructions/options/mandates on how to vote on proposed 
subdivisions, and this too would be as the Legislature intended. 
Petitioner disagrees. He believes the Legislature would find the 'trusted' advisors 
in South Weber as anything but trustworthy in their generation and conduct of the closed 
meeting of 22 January 2004. The Legislature could be even more critical of City officials 
who, individually and collectively, failed to correct violations (including this and possibly 
other open-meeting-law violations) after they learned-on 24 Jun 04 of their misplaced 
trust. 
CONCLUSION 
The City Manager called, without authority to do so, the closed meeting of January 
22, 2004. This meeting was supposedly to discuss strategy over litigation but the 
Commission had no judicial responsibilities whatsoever. The Manager invited the City 
Attorney to attend who then provided the Commissioners with options on how to vote on a 
proposed subdivision on the agenda for the same evening; but State case law shows that all 
"information obtaining" must be in open meetings. The Commissioners later received 
training which showed their closed meeting and related subsequent actions to be in 
violation of State law/City ordinances but they did nothing to rectify those violations. 
While Petitioner concludes that the above practices warrant intervention as argued 
in this reply and his earlier brief, he is not so sure that the City would misrepresent the 
minutes of the meeting as conveyed to the Court However, the Mayor was not at this 
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particular closed meeting so he cannot attest to the accuracy of the minutes as the City 
suggested ex par'te. (Record - pages 47,58). Therefore, Petitioner asks the Court (before 
reviewing them in camera) to have the Commissioners, who attended the subject closed 
meeting, authenticate the minutes thereof in the same fashion as they approve all their 
minutes. 
Relief requested remains as stated in Petitioner's brief on pages 19-20. 
Brent Poll, Pro Se Date 
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Subject: Planning Commission 
Closed Meeting - 22 Jan 04 
To whom it may concern; 
One of several agenda items listed for the Planning Commission on 22 January 2004 was a 
request for approval of the Byram subdivision. As the potential impact on us was considerable 
and because we had filed a lawsuit questioning the rezone for this subdivision, several family 
members planned to attend. I went to City Hall during the day of the January 22nd to check if the 
meeting was still on schedule. I learned that, since the agenda had been scheduled, a change had 
been added calling a closed "executive session in accordance to UCS 52-4-5(1 )(a)(iii)." 
We were not new to the South Weber political processes. My brother was a former councilman 
and I served as Chairman of the City's Board of Adjustments for several terms. Such service 
involved training from the League of Cities and Towns as well as copious provision of written 
instruction, case examples and general advice about how the legislative and administrative 
processes should work. 
Therefore, I was surprised to see the Commission scheduled for a closed session to consider 
strategy over pending litigation. To my knowledge such a closed session had never happened 
before and seemed contrary to official functions of the Commission. 
I contacted most of the Commissioners and soon they we contacting each other over this. None 
claimed to know what the closed session concerned, none claimed to have called it, and none 
knew who had called this closed meeting. I contacted the Commission chairperson (Delene 
Hyde) at her place of employment just several hours before the closed meeting was scheduled to 
begin and her first statement was "what closed meeting." She knew nothing about it and went 
on to say she had never been in one while serving on the Commission. 
By the time of the call to Ms. Hyde, I had obtained the unsigned form (attachment #1) which 
was the document the City's clerical staff felt may have been the authorization for calling the 
closed meeting. After talking with her I checked City ordinances to determine who besides the 
Commissioners had authority to call meetings for them. Ordinance 10-3-4 (attachment #2) 
shows that the Commission chairperson presides at meetings and the Commissioners adopt 
policies and procedures for their "own organization." Others including the City Manager and 
Mayor may provide advice (also according to City ordinances) but no one outside the 
Commission has authorization to call meetings for it per City Ordinance 10-3-4 and Utah Code 
Ann. 52-4-2(1). 
1375 E. 7605 S. • South Weber, UT • 84405 
Some watching the Commissioners come out of the closed meeting, said they appeared "shell 
shocked." They were, to me, uncommonly quiet and sober. The City attorney left immediately. 
The Mayor was not there (see enclosure #3 for participants). Business proceeded to the Byram 
Subdivision proposal with the City Manager and developer pushing hard for approval and the 
Commission remaining much more reserved than on the past occasions. Finally Ivan Ray, Grant 
Dickamore, myself and others in the audience spoke out to dispute the City Manager and 
Developer with evidence that the subdivision was not "good to go'9 as they claimed. Acting on 
the input from the audience, the Commission voted 5 - 0 to table the request until the developer 
could resolve an assortment of problems including either showing proof of ownership or 
easements for placement of utilities down 1375 East. 
Soon after the meeting, I researched the Commission and Council meeting minutes as far back 
as the City Clerk could find them, and found no other case where the Commission was called 
into a Closed Session. However, there was a huge increase in the number of closed sessions for 
the Council since the hiring of our City Manager. I discussed this with others in the LLC, most 
of whom do not trust the City Manager, and it was decided that I would petition the District 
Court pro se to review the two most suspicious of those closed sessions. The process seemed 
very simple as described in applicable law, but hasn't proven to be as routine in practice. 
The developer returned to the Commission 22 Apr 04 without the proof of ownership or 
easements required 5-0 in January. The developer reported that City staff said such wasn't 
necessary. The City Manager incorrectly indicated that the Mayor, not the Commission, gave the 
official interpretation of a city street and the Mayor felt 1375 East was a City street. A 
commissioner well disputed the City Managers claim, but the Manager and Commission 
Chairperson brought up again the input from the closed meeting with the City Attorney. The 
Chairperson said (lines 268-271 page 8) "we met with our attorney and so you have to make 
decisions base on the information he gave to you." The attorney only met with the Commission 
in the closed 22 Jan 04 session. The matter before the Commission was the request to approve 
the Byram subdivision. It was then approved 3 to 2. This confirmed for us beyond any doubt 
that the "information" the attorney provided was "information obtaining" for the Commissioners 
on how/why to vote on the Byram subdivision; and that the only way the public could obtain it 
was through the petition filed earlier in District Court 
The Council and Commission were provided instruction by the League of Cities and Town on 
24 Jun 2004. Ms Sidney Fonnesbeck was the instructor. The City made an audio tape of this 
but did not transcribe the training for convenient future use. However, our family acquired a 
copy of the tape through GRAMA and transcribed it ourselves. This consisted of about 27 
single-pace pages. The instructor, while considerate as always, was extremely critical of many of 
the administrative and legislative practices of the City. The instructor thought the City would 
have to start over at "square one" if a Court learned City Ordinances had not been followed. The 
examples presented by the 'students' were not hypothetical. They were taken exactingly from 
examples of Commission and Council activity. One of those was the case of the Commission's 
closed meeting. While our transcription was not an official City transcription; we sent a copy to 
the City making it an official City record. The City Manager was typically dismissive as my wife 
had misidentified a voice on the tape as his although he was not in attendance. However, no one 
questioned the substance of the training itself. 
The part about closed meetings starts in the middle of page 21 and ends near the bottom of page 
23 (see attachment #4). The training shows: 
(1) Is it okay for us to receive advice in a closed meeting about how we should vote 
on a rezone or a subdivision? Answer - one word - emphatic "no." The dialog shows this 
was related to the Commission's closed session. 
(2) The Mayor suggested that "anybody can recommend" a closed meeting, but the 
instructor cut him off, by saying that "most of the time you couldn't have one if you wanted one." 
The Mayor continued with the case at issue and said "the City Manager recommended one and 
then you quys (commissioners) decided whether you wanted one or not." 
(3) The Commissioners took issue with the Mayor by stating that the attorney was 
already there, but they "had no proposed closed meeting until we got here." Therefore, they 
never "called" or invited the attorney to the closed meeting but the City Manager (who had no 
authority to do so) supposedly called it and invited him.. The Commissioners, per this training, 
did not know enough at the time to simply sent the attorney home.. 
(4) The instructor asked (page 22), "what was the reason for closing the Commission." 
Responses included "new litigation" and "got some lawsuit and met with the attorney." The 
instructor countered that (page 23) "there are very few times when the Planning Commission" 
can warrant a closed session and that Councils "may do it more than" Commissions. She said if 
the closed meeting is "really quasi-judicial" the closure can be justified. 
The training seemed conclusive. What part of a one word answer (no) did the participates 
not understand? Closed meetings could not be held to obtain information on how to vote. 
However, no remedial actions followed. Not on the closed- meeting issue or the more 
substantive matters where "starting over at square one" then seemed necessary. 
During August through November Commission meetings (complete with blank/ erased 
portions of taped minutes) a debate existed as to exactly what the City Manager meant in 
telling the Commissioners not to follow the instruction they had received in June from the 
League of City's and Towns. The City Manager and some Commissioners now assert 
that he only meant not to follow the instructor's advice on draft minutes, but the issue 
before the Commission in August was whether it should address errors of a more 
substantial nature. Some of the Commissioners "didn't want to hear" about such errors. 
From reading the record, listening to the tapes and finding no effort to correct the 
errors identified in training, I conclude that the instruction from the City Manager 
(at least) was not to follow the lastrrotor's corrective criticisms in general. 
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SOUTH WEBER PLANNING COMMISSION 
CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION 
DATE OF MEETING: 22 January 2004 TIME COMMENCED: 5:05 p.m 
PRESENT: CHAIR: 
COMMISSIONERS: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
CITY MANAGER: 
Purpose: To discuss pending litigation. 
Am< motion to adjourn from thTpubric^wofk-st at p.m. and go into an executive 
session in accordance to UCS 52-4-5(l)(a)(iii) for the purpose of discussing pending litigation 
was made by Commissioner and seconded by Commissioner . 
Commissioners , , , voted yes. The motion 
carried. 
8 
9 
10 
II 
The meeting adjourned at 6: p.m. and the Council went back into the public work session. 
******************* 
We certify that the foregoing represents a true, accurate record of the Executive Session for the South Weber 
City Council Executive Session held on Tuesday, 22 January 2004. No tape recording was done. 
******************** 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Approved: 
CHAIR: Delene Hyde 
Clerk: Debora Cowdin 
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10-3-2 10-3^ 
proposed or existing streets, also the acquisitions of land for new streets, or 
the acceptance of private streets for public use, and the sale of or lease of 
City-owned streets; d) the acquisition or acceptance of land for any public 
property, public way, ground, place or structure, also the sale or lease of 
City-owned property, and the location of public buildings, parks or open 
spaces; e) the location and extent of public or private utilities; and f) the 
subdivision of land, shall be submitted to the Planning Commission for 
consideration and recommendation before action is taken thereon by the 
City Council or other City official. (Ord. 96-2, 10-22-1996, eff. 12-1-1996; 
amd. 1998 Code) 
10-3-3: TERMS OF OFFICE: The term of office for each appointive 
member of such Planning Commission shall be five (5) years 
and until his successor is appointed. In January 1999, the terms of existing 
members shall be adjusted by the Mayor with the consent of the City 
Council so that one term expires on January 31 each year. One member 
shall be appointed in January of each successive year. The Mayor may 
remove any member of the Planning Commission without cause as 
determined solely by the discretion of the Mayor and as approved by a 
majority of the City Council. Any member of the Planning Commission so 
removed shall be entitled to a public hearing before the City Council if a 
hearing is requested in writing within five (5) days of a City Council vote. 
The purpose of the hearing is to allow the member being removed to be 
heard on the issue of removal. (Ord. 98-13, 8-11-1998) 
10-3-4: ORGANIZATION: The Planning Commission shall elect one 
of its members to act as chairperson for a period of one year, 
and a member to act as vice chairperson. The chairperson and/or vice 
chairperson may be elected for successive terms. The chairperson will 
preside at all meetings of the Planning Commission unless absent, in which 
case the vice chairperson will preside. The Planning Commission shall 
adopt such policies and procedures for its own organization and for the 
transaction of business not in conflict with ordinances or State laws, which 
policies and procedures shall be approved by the City Council before taking 
effect. Report of official acts and recommendations of the Planning 
Commission shall be made by the chairperson in writing to the City Council 
and to such other City officials and persons as the City Council may direct, 
and shall indicate how each member of the Planning Commission voted 
with respect to such act or recommendation. Any member of the Planning 
Commission may also make a concurring or dissenting report or 
recommendation to the City Council whenever he deems advisable. (Ord. 
98-13,8-11-1998) 
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278 ADJOURNED: Commissioner Semerau moved to adjourn the Planning Commission 
279 meeting at 8:55 p.m. Commissioner Stark seconded. A roll call vote was taken and all 
280 were in favor. 
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282 
283 
284 
285 
286 
APPROVED: DATE: ,3/teM-
ATTEST: 
Delene Hyde, Chairperson 
Michelle Clark, Transcriber 
<:
-"I>ebbie Cowdin, City Clerk 
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288 
289 
"296 
291 
292 
293 
294 
295 
296 
297 
298 
299 
300 
301 
302 
303 
304 
305 
306 
307 
Members Present: 
Meeting Began: 
PLANNING COMMISSION WORK MEETING 
JANUARY 22,2004 
Barry Burton, Ron Chandler, Delene Hyde, Ryan Semerau, Linda Stark, Tom 
Graydon, Tim Grubb, and Debbie Cowdin. 
6:00 p.m. 
Change of Znmnp; Request. Parcels #09-005-0003. (20.6 acres), and #09-005-0028. (20 acres), 
approximatelv 2300 East and 8300 South. South Weber, ftom A (Agricultural) Density Zone to the R-M 
(Residential Moderate) Density Zone. Bruce L. Nilson. agent: Delene asked if everyone was familiar with 
where this property was located. All commissioners knew the location. The zoning requested is what the 
projected land use map shows. It is also me same zone as the surrounding properties. All agreed the 
request seemed reasonable. Delene questioned if 8200 South, off of Deer Run Way, would remain a cul-
de-sac or if 8200 South which runs between Heritage Hills and Hidden Oak would connect into it. Ron 
stated a lot would depend on if Calvin Waters still owns a one foot holding strip through that property. We 
would also need to wait to see what the developer has planned. 
Attorney Stephen Noel arrived at 6:05 p.m. Commissioner Semerau moved to adjourn from the public 
work session and go into an executive session in accordance to UCS 52-4-5(lXa)(iii) for the purpose of 
discussing pending litigation. Commissioner Graydon seconded the motion. Commissioners Hyde, 
Semerau, Stark, Graydon, and Grubb voted yes. The motion carried. 
- i t L| 
Adjustments its absolutely leave them alone. You have nothing to do with the Board of 
Adjustments after the appointment, or to make sure they have got money and staff and that sort 
of thing. When I was on the City Council I appeared before the Board of Adjustments once as a 
witness and apologized for being there and said I'm not here as a member of the City Council, 
I'm here as a member of my neighborhood council because I had evidence that I thought only I 
had and it affected the decision. I think they were really kind of mad that I showed up at all. 
And something either goes to one or the other. For instance, variances never go to the City 
Council, they go only to the Board of Adjustments. Administrative appeals, only to the Board of 
Adjustments. And once they are heard by the Board of Adjustment they only go to the Court. 
The City Council never sees those things. They don't see them before, they don't see them after. 
Now occasionally you'll get something like a subdivision application that would go to the 
Planning Commission. And they will say that the way you've got this done, or the way you've 
got this house situated on this property, we grant that until you've got the variance. So they table 
it, send it to the Board of Adjustment. The Board of Adjustment looks at it and then says to the 
guy "yea" or "nay" and takes it back to the Planning Commission to either change the property or 
? this kind of variance. So there's a slight interaction. But not with the City Council 
So just make sure there well cared for but don't mess with them. Okay? 
Voice> Any other questions? 
Instructor> I have weft. What about closed meetings? Is it okay for us to receive advice in a 
closed meeting about how we should vote on a rezone or a subdivision? No. Who calls the 
closed meetings and who makes up the agenda? And how often should a closed meeting be 
called? The State Law is very very specific about when you can close a meeting. My own 
personal practice while on the City Council is we never closed a meeting unless our attorney was 
there quoting the law because we always had reporters at our meetings so we never closed a 
meeting unless the attorney would stand up and say, "the Council has called for a closed meeting 
based on 16-4-3 of the State Code that says...and this is the one they are going to be doing and it 
has to do with security, it has to do with personal information, it has to do with reprimanding an 
employee, it has to do with financials and then the other one is if there has been filed a lawsuit. 
It cannot be a pending lawsuit it has to have been filed. You don't do it casually. That's another 
thing you can get really in big trouble for. 
Mayor> I think one of the things that we have been discussing in both the Commission and the 
Council is that anybody can recommend a closed meeting but its that body that can decide 
whether they do it or not isn't it? Or if it fits the.... 
Instructor No. And most of the time you couldn't have one if you wanted one. Some developer 
walks in and says I don't want anybody to know my plans so I want you to close the meeting. 
You say, I'm sorry but the law doesn't allow us to close the meeting. 
Mayor> I think one of the points is that I think the players in this case is the City Manager 
recommended one and then you guys decided whether you wanted one or not. 
21 
Instructor I sure make them quote the law. 
Voice> The City Attorney was there so... 
Instructor> The City Attorney was there but we had no proposed closed meeting until we got 
here? 
Voice> That's true. 
Instructor And by ways the City Council would ?? the Planning Commission. What was the 
reason for closing the Planning Commission? 
Voice> A new litigation. 
Voice> We've got some lawsuit and met with the attorney. 
Instructor The minutes of your meeting ought to show and quote the law and what part of the 
law you are calling it and then there's no question about it. So, about the minutes...If it's the City 
Manager that's calling it he had to come prepared it needs to be on the agenda that your going to 
have the closed meeting and then he needs to actually quote the law and become part of the 
minutes and then you vote on it. You vote on whether or not you want to close it. We had one 
member of our City Council that no matter what it was she voted against it just because that was 
her personal philosophy that there should never be a closed meeting, but she knew the rest of us 
would vote for it so she never had to. She never voted for a tax increase even though she knew 
we had to have one. We all were kind of "pissed off' at her. 
Voice> The minutes of those meetings... 
Instructor They have to be taken and GRAMA stipulates specifically the GRAMA rules that say 
exactly what you have to do with closed meetings. They can be closed. In fact to go out of a 
closed meeting and tell people what you've heard in that closed meeting is a violation of a law. 
And you never want to extend beyond that and votes have to be taken publicly. So you may get 
information during a closed meeting but if its something that's going to affect people, I guess you 
could take a closed meeting as to whether or not you are going proceed in the lawsuit or not. But 
you have to be careful that you don't wander. Our attorney would sit there and if we started 
wandering he'd say, " Up time to reopen the meeting." So then we'd take a vote to reopen the 
meeting and open the doors and invite anybody who was still sitting around to come in and 
regroup. I guess it was because we were under a lot of scrutiny and we were always very careful 
about that. But that's the sort of thing that you can blow up over. Again that's one of those due 
process procedural things that you just want to be really careful about. There's nothing wrong in 
doing it, but just make sure you're doing it legally. 
Voice> Those minutes would need to be approved by that body here or ...I've never approved 
22 
any...I mean I'm curious... 
Instructor Fm not an expert on GRAMA. I'm sorry. Hopefully your recorder is. They spend a 
lot of time training on GRAMA and GRAMA changes every once in a while. I just know that 
they have to be taken. 
Voice> As a Councilperson though, if we see those we could request those? 
Instructor> Oh sure. And there's some situation on which they have to be read or available but 
I'm not sure exactly what it is. If you're are in a lawsuit about what you did in the meeting then 
the minutes would be disclosed. So I'm not exactly sure how its done. 
Voice> I know there is some issues where they requested that the minutes be made public 
minutes but I've never seen them... 
Mayor> And I think... 
Instructor> This would probably be a good topic for a workshop. We do have the recorders all 
the time but maybe can become an expert this. 
Mayor> I know what's happened several times in our City is that there would be a request for 
closed meeting minutes and if it is still felt that that person shouldn't have it, then he can go to 
"upheld the records" or whatever and then the Judge can decide there. 
Instructor> Yeah something like that. If you are considering firing your employee for something 
that's illegal, why have a closed meeting if you are going to turn around and release? it. It would 
do just as much damage. So there are ways of getting access to them but it is not as simple as 
walking in and asking to see them. There are very few times when the Planning Commission, 
City Council may do it more often than the Planning Commission. There's some argument.. I 
had an argue with me that he could close the Board of Adjustment meeting. But then it 
contradicts itself. Because Judges don't go in their chambers and do all kinds of things in closed 
meetings. If its really quasi-judicial they have the right to do it too. But then there's another part 
of the ordinances that says all meetings will be open to the public. So its kind of a contradiction. 
I just say do it publicly, don't take a chance. 
Any other questions? 
You got the ethics rules down? Conflict of interest and all that kind of stuff. You are okay with 
all that? 
Voice> I understand that conflict of interest you don't have to declare "conflict of interest" 
unless you can get financial gain from it. That what Craig Bott? told me, right? 
23 
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&rch - 100 Results - legislative process open "closed meeting" iPage 9 of 12 
process. See Utah Code Ann. 5 10-2-401 to -426 (1999 & Supp. 2000). Because of this 
statutory scheme, local governments in our state are authorized to annex land, provided they 
follow the statutory guidelines. Moreover, as part of the statutory framework, the legislature 
also created a mechanism for the resolution of annexation disputes. This method of dispute 
resolution involves county boundary commissions. 
[*P23] The process of annexing an unincorporated area to a municipality generally begins 
with the filing of an annexation petition. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-402(2) (1999) 
("Except as provided in Section 10-2-418, a municipality may not annex an unincorporated 
[ * *692] area unless a petition under Section 10-2-403 is filed requesting annexation"), 
and Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-403(1) (1999) ("Except as provided in Section 10-2-418, the 
process to annex an unincorporated area to a municipality is initiated by a petition as 
provided in this section), with Utah Code Ann. § 10-2- 418 (1999) (explaining how, 
notwithstanding [ * * * 1 9 ] subsection 10-2-402(2), a municipality may annex an area 
without an annexation petition if, for example, the area to be annexed consists of islands 
within or peninsulas contiguous to the municipality). The annexation petition is filed with the 
city recorder or town clerk of the proposed annexing municipality. § 10-2-403(2)(a). The 
legislative body of the proposed annexing municipality may either deny or accept the 
petition. § 10-2-405(l)(a). If the legislative body of the proposed municipality accepts the 
petition, the city recorder or town clerk for that municipality then determines if the petition is 
valid by deciding whether the petition meets the necessary requirements of subsections 10-2-
403(2), (3), and (4). § 10-2-405(2)(a). If the petition passes muster, the city recorder or 
town clerk then certifies the petition and provides written notice of the certification to various 
persons and entities, including the county legislative body. § 10-2-405(2)(b)(i). 
[*P24] The legislative annexation scheme then permits the county legislative body to 
oppose an annexation petition by filing a protest to the petition, Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-407 
( l)(a)( i) [ * * * 2 0 ] (Supp. 2000), thereby creating an adversarial process. The protest is 
filed with either the county boundary commission, § 10- 2-407(2)(a)(i)(B)(I), or with the 
clerk of the county in which the area proposed for annexation is located if the county has not 
yet created a boundary commission, § 10-2-407(2)(a)(i)(B)(II). Regardless of with whom the 
protest is filed, an existing boundary commission must review the annexation petition and 
protest, or one must be formed to do so. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-409 (1999) (explaining 
that at the time a protest is filed, a boundary commission may already exist because a 
county legislative body may create a boundary commission at any time, and that if a 
boundary commission does not exist at the time a protest is filed under section 10-2-407, the 
county legislative body must form a boundary commission within thirty days of the filing of 
the protest). In other words, the legislature provided that where an annexation petition is 
protested, each county must create, at some point, a boundary commission to resolve the 
dispute. 
[*P25] HAfI2,?0nce created, the role of a county boundary commission is [ * * *21 ] to 
"hear and decide, according to the provisions of this part, n l each protest filed under Section 
10-2-407, with respect to any area within that county." § 10-2-412. In essence the boundary 
commission is required to apply the rules promulgated by the legislature regarding 
annexation to factual circumstances before it. HN13m¥The boundary commission is instructed 
to issue a written decision on the proposed annexation. § 10-2-416(2). In this sense, the 
mandate to resolve disputes between adverse parties by applying rules of law to a particular 
set of facts is judicial in nature, meaning the boundary commission performs a judicial 
function. 
- - Footnotes 
n l Part 4 of title 10, chapter 2, of the Utah Code includes sections 401 to 426, the statutory 
provisions pertaining to annexation. 
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- - End Footnotes 
[*P26] However, in performing its role of deciding protests, the boundary commission 
generally retains a "feasibility consultant" to conduct a "feasibility study," see § 10-2-413, 
and then holds a public hearing, see § 10-2-415. A [ * * *22 ] feasibility consultant is 
required to analyze and report on different factors pertaining to the area proposed for 
annexation including, among other things, population and population density, natural 
boundaries, current and five-year projections of demographics and economic base, projected 
growth over the next five years, projected revenues and costs of governmental services for 
the next five years, cultural and social aspects of the surrounding area, and the potential 
effect on school districts. § 10-2-413(3)(a). At the hearing, the feasibility consultant presents 
the results of the feasibility study, and the boundary commission takes public comment. As 
such, the boundary commission considers whether a proposed [ * *693] annexation is good 
policy. In this sense, the boundary commission acts in a legislative capacity. In sum, the 
boundary commission functions as both a legislative body and an adjudicative body. 
[*P27] Nevertheless, the role of a county boundary commission is, on the whole, 
essentially one of resolving disputes between competing parties, the petitioner and the 
protesting party. Thus, even though the boundary commission engages a consultant to 
gather information [ * * * 2 3 ] and present recommendations on matters of policy, the county 
boundary commission is mandated by the legislature to apply the law to the facts and 
information presented to it by the feasibility consultant, petitioner, and protester. See § 10-
2-402, 403. For these reasons, HN14lE\Ne conclude that boundary commissions act as quasi-
judicial bodies when considering annexation petitions and protests. 
[*P28] In addition, we are further persuaded that the process of considering annexation 
petitions and protests is litigation. First, decisions of a county boundary commission are 
subject to judicial review. HN1S¥"Review of a boundary commission decision may be sought 
in the district court . . . . " § 10-2-417(1). H/VI6?Even though the district court reviews the 
decision of the boundary commission under an arbitrary and capricious standard, see § 10-2-
417(2) & (3), the district court is authorized to review whether the decision of the 
commission was contrary to the annexation laws set forth by the state legislature. 
[*P29] Plaintiff Kearns-Tribune also acknowledged before the district court that "a 
proceeding before a tribunal like the Utah State Tax Commission would qualify as [ * * * 2 4 ] 
Mitigation1 for the purposes of the litigation exception." Plaintiff argued before the district 
court, however, that proceedings before the Tax Commission were different from proceedings 
before the Salt Lake County Boundary Commission because, according to plaintiff, the 
Boundary Commission lacked rules of procedure like the Tax Commission. We are persuaded, 
however, that county boundary commission proceedings are analogous to contested 
proceedings before the State Tax Commission n2 and constitute litigation under the litigation 
exception to the Open and Public Meetings Act. The Salt Lake County Boundary Commission 
conducts its proceedings pursuant to rules of procedure and the proceedings before the 
Boundary Commission bear all of the necessary accouterments of litigation. 
- Footnotes -
n2 We have previously indicated that the Tax Commission is a quasi-judicial body, Salt Lake 
County v. Tax Comm'n, 532 P.2d 680, 682 (Utah 1975), that is also subject to judicial 
review, see Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 to -610 (outlining the method of judicial review of 
tax commission decisions). 
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determination. See Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 
1985); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 
S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). This standard is highly deferential to the trial court 
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the evidence is 
adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to be in the best position to 
assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, 
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record. In re J. 
Children, 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1983). 
[71 ("81 When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, 
the standard of review is not phrased as "clearly erroneous." Rather, appellate review of 
a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
"correctness." Controlling Utah case law teaches that "correctness" means the appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); see Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). This is because 
appellate courts have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say what 
the faw is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Charles Alan 
Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 751, 779 (1957); 
see Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1266. In other words, one can visualize the traditional 
standard-of-review scheme as a continuum of deference anchored at either end by the 
clearly erroneous and correction-of-error standards, which correspond with whether the 
issue is characterized as one of fact or of law. 
The parties here have characterized the standard-of-review question before us in terms 
of this fact/law distinction and argue the issue as though the options were 
metaphorically black and white—one option being "clearly erroneous" and the other 
"correctness," with the first requiring very broad deference to the trial court and the 
second none. I t is common for parties to characterize the standard-of-review debate in 
such a polarized manner. Steven A. Childress, A Standards of Review Primer: Federal 
Civil Appeals, 125 F.R.D. 319, 328 (1989); see Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision 
Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 
64 S.Cal.L.Rev. 235, 239-45 (1991). However, we think that these distinctions tend to 
obscure the real issues. Although the universe of questions presented for review has 
often been characterized as consisting only of mutually exclusive questions of fact or 
law, there is really a third category—the application of law to fact or, stated more-fully, 
the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule 
of law. I t is this determination that is at the heart of the dispute between the parties 
over the appropriate standard of review for reasonable-suspicion determinations. And it 
is a dispute with real consequences. 
Although implicitly recognizing this fact-to-law category of issues, the parties act as 
though there are only two possible standards of review— correctness and clearly 
erroneous. The State would like us to defer to a trial judge's determination that on a 
particular set of facts reasonable suspicion was present, thus raising a very substantial 
hurdle to one challenging such a trial court determination. On the other hand, Pena 
would like the opportunity to convince an appellate court that the trial judge's factual 
findings do not satisfy the legal standard for reasonable suspicion. He wants us to make 
this decision without deferring at all to the trial judge on the application of the legal 
standard to the facts: in other words, to address the matter entirely de novo under a 
correctness standard. 
[9] This third category of determinations raises thorny issues. In the abstract, the 
effect of a given set of facts is a question of law and, therefore, one on which an 
appellate court owes no deference to a trial court's determination. In recognition of this 
fact, the standard of review for such determinations is termed one of "correctness." This 
is *937 the message in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781-82, and in Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
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10-3-2 10-3-4 
proposed or existing streets, also the acquisitions of land for new streets, or 
the acceptance of private streets for public use, and the sale of or lease of 
City-owned streets; d) the acquisition or acceptance of land for any public 
property, public way, ground, place or structure, also the sale or lease of 
City-owned property, and the location of public buildings, parks or open 
spaces; e) the location and extent of public or private utilities; and f) the 
subdivision of land, Shall be submitted to the Planning Commission for 
consideration and recommendation before action is taken thereon by the 
City Council or other City official. (Ord. 96-2, 10-22-1996, eff. 12-1-1996; 
amd. 1998 Code) 
10-3-3: TERMS OF OFFICE: The term of office for each appointive 
member of such Planning Commission shall be five (5) years 
and until his successor is appointed. In January 1999, the terms of existing 
members shall be adjusted by the Mayor with the consent of the City 
Council so that one term expires on January 31 each year. One member 
shall be appointed in January of each successive year. The Mayor may 
remove any member of the Planning Commission without cause as 
determined solely by the discretion of the Mayor and as approved by a 
majority of the City Council. Any member of the Planning Commission so 
removed shall be entitled to a public hearing before the City Council if a 
hearing is requested in writing within five (5) days of a City Council vote. 
The purpose of the hearing is to allow the member being removed to be 
heard on the issue of removal. (Ord. 98-13, 8-11-1998) 
10-3-4: ORGANIZATION: The Planning Commission shall elect one 
of its members to act as chairperson for a period of one year, 
and a member to act as vice chairperson. The chairperson and/or vice 
chairperson may be elected for successive terms. The chairperson will 
preside at all meetings of the Planning Commission unless absent, in which 
case the vice chairperson will preside. The Planning Commission shall 
adopt such policies and procedures for its own organization and for the 
transaction of business not in conflict with ordinances or State laws, which 
policies and procedures shall be approved by the City Council before taking 
effect. Report of official acts and recommendations of the Planning 
Commission shall be made by the chairperson in writing to the City Council 
and to such other City officials and persons as the City Council may direct, 
and shall indicate how each member of the Planning Commission voted 
with respect to such act or recommendation. Any member of the Planning 
Commission may also make a concurring or dissenting report or 
recommendation to the City Council whenever he deems advisable. (Ord. 
98-13,8-11-1998) 
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